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REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Wright defendants, in their Statement of Facts at 
page 6, contend that the Sawmill Canyon road has been used his-
torically only for domestic livestock purposes. The facts are 
otherwise. The road has been used for a variety of purposes, 
certainly including grazing domestic livestock, but also includ-
ing recreational hunting, hunting by persons holding permits, 
construction and maintenance. (Finding of Fact No. 10.) The 
road has carried a variety of vehicles, including recreational 
vehicles. (Id.) The Wrights1 own brief at pp. 8-10 demonstrates 
use of the property for hunting by permitted hunters and others 
prior to the abandonment of the road by Summit County. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY RESPONDENTS DO NOT 
SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENT. 
Respondents persist in misinterpreting the two cases 
they cite in support of their position, and particularly the 
Hague decision. Respondents rely on that decision to support 
their contention that the use of the road cannot be expanded 
beyond its lawful use at the time of abandonment. Neither Hague 
nor any other decision cited by respondents supports that 
position. 
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Respondents' entire argument rests on the language from 
Hague, which they cite at p. 14 of their brief, as follows: 
Respondent's legal right to a reasonably 
convenient passageway from his premises to 
the street certainly cannot be questioned nor 
interfered with by appellant. Nor can 
respondent prevent appellant from using the 
channel for the purposes for which it was 
constructed and used prior to the commence-
ment of the action. The extent of the appel-
lant's rights, however, in fluming and main-
taining said channel are not unlimited. If 
the banks or sides of the channel were main-
tained in the street at a certain width and 
height during all of the years the channel 
had been used by the appellant, it may not, 
for its own convenience, change the channel, 
if such change interferes with the rights of 
others. 
Hague v. Juab County Mill & Elevator Company, 107 P. 249, 251 
(Utah 1910). 
It is critical to an understanding of the quoted lan-
guage that the reader know which party is "appellant" and which 
party is "respondent". The appellant in Hague was the landowner 
(actually the owner of a water channel) over whom the easement 
crossed. The appellant in Hague, then, corresponds to the Wright 
defendants in the instant case. The respondent, on the other 
hand, was the person seeking the easement, which corresponds to 
Shirley Gillmor in the instant case. With that understanding, it 
is clear to see that the restrictions set down in Hague apply to 
the Wrights, not to Shirley Gillmor. Hague said that the Wrights 
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can continue to use their property for the purposes for which the 
Wrights used their property prior to the commencement of the law-
suit, and that Shirley Gillmor cannot interfere with the Wrights1 
use of their property. However, the court went on to say that 
the Wrights' use of their property is not unlimited and that they 
may not change the use of their property for their own conve-
nience if to do so would interfere with Shirley Gillmor's right 
to cross the property. The Hague decision says nothing about 
what Shirley Gillmor can and cannot do with the road, let alone 
with her own property. It does not say that the Wrights cannot 
alter the use of their own property over time. It says only that 
the Wrights, by changing the use of their property, cannot inter-
fere with Shirley Gillmor's easement across the property. In 
other words, if the Wrights want to build an amusement park at 
the mouth of Sawmill Canyon, they are free to do so, so long as 
Shirley Gillmor can cross with vehicles or livestock. 
It should also be noted that neither Hague, nor Mason, 
nor any other case cited by any of the parties holds that use of 
the road is restricted to "lawful use," which respondents have 
interpreted to mean lawful use of the property. That is a quali-
fication injected by respondents with absolutely no basis in law 
and one which resulted in a time-consuming and unnecessary 
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sojourn in this case through the zoning regulations of Summit 
County. 
Even if the holding in Hague is turned around 180 
degrees and the restrictions imposed there on the underlying 
landowner are imposed instead on the person seeking the easement, 
it still does not support respondents' position in this case. 
Shirley Gillmor would still be allowed to alter her use of the 
road over time, so long as her doing so did not interfere with 
the Wrights' use of their property. The trial court expressly 
found, at Findings of Fact No. 18 and 19, that the use of the 
road for hunters created no additional burden on the road or on 
adjoining property. 
Appellant submits that Judge Wilkinson, in ruling from 
the bench on plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, mis-
understood the Hague decision which, at first glance, without an 
understanding of which party is which, can be misunderstood. 
Judge Murphy, in contrast, was alerted in oral argument following 
the trial to the confusion created by the quoted language. In 
his written opinion, issued some time after the trial, he indi-
cated that he disagreed with Judge Wilkinson's interpretation and 
application of Hague, which Judge Murphy said was inapposite to 
the instant case. (Summary Decision at p. 4.) Judge Murphy also 
expressed his opinion that the purposes for which access are 
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sought do not determine whether access is to be allowed, and that 
"a destination purpose does not taint one's use of an easement or 
right-of-way as long as that use is not a different or greater 
burden on the servient estate." (Id. at p. 7.) His own inter-
pretation notwithstanding, however, Judge Murphy felt constrained 
by the law of the case doctrine to abide by Judge Wilkinson's 
earlier ruling. (Id. at p. 8.) 
Shirley Gillmor should be allowed to cross the Wrights' 
property on the Sawmill Canyon road, as she has always done, 
regardless of her reason for doing so. There is no Utah law 
which holds otherwise. 
II. IN NO EVENT SHOULD THE NATURE OF THE EASEMENT 
BE DETERMINED BY THE USE OF THE PROPERTY. 
There are sound reasons why the Utah Supreme Court 
would not establish a rule limiting an easement to access for 
historical use of the property only. To do so would mean that 
the use of property reached by an easement could never be 
changed, regardless of the amount of time which passed, or how 
inefficient and wasteful such an unnecessary restriction might 
be. The effect would be that the use of the road, fixed in time, 
would thereafter control the use of the property. 
In addition, such a de facto restriction on the use of 
the property would be inconsistent with the system which has been 
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established for regulation of the use of real property. In the 
instant case, the use of the Sawmill property is controlled by 
Summit County. Summit County enacts zoning regulations. Summit 
County determines when a use is permitted or prohibited by its 
zoning rules. Summit County determines when exceptions to zoning 
requirements will be allowed, and under what conditions. 
Shirley Gillmor should be allowed to travel over the 
road in vehicles because, as the trial court found, her doing so 
does not impose an additional burden on the road and does not 
infringe, in any way, upon the Wrights' use of their property. 
What she does when she reaches her property can, and should be, 
controlled by Summit County. If Summit County has since decided 
that Mrs. Gillmor1 s use of the property for hunting is allowed 
under applicable zoning laws, then it would make no sense to make 
such use of the property impossible now because, at the time Sum-
mit County abandoned the Sawmill Canyon road, Stephen Gillmor had 
not yet obtained a conditional use permit and, therefore, can 
never use the road for hunters. 
To restrict the use of the road to its use at the time 
of abandonment, to characterize the use of the road by the use of 
the property at the end of the road, and to prevent thereby any 
change of the use of the property, is not required by Utah law 
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and would be a bad policy with respect to the development and use 
of real property in this state. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed 
insofar as it denies Shirley Gillmor an easement to transport 
permitted hunters. Plaintiff should be awarded a private ease-
ment of access for all purposes, together with a judgment for 
damages and an injunction prohibiting any further interference by 
the Wright defendants. 
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